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OPINION  
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Our criminal justice apparatus is not the Eye of 
Providence.  Though ever vigilant, it cannot see all, and it is 
mightily aware of that.  So it relies on the eyes and ears of 
private citizens from many walks of life.  These citizens are 
rewarded for their heroics at times, but their rewards rarely, if 
ever, amount to an expectation, let alone an interest, that they 
can pursue in the criminal case of another.  This is because, as 
the Supreme Court has observed, “in American jurisprudence 
at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest 
in the prosecution or non[-]prosecution of another.”  Linda R.S. 
(“Linda”) v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). 
 Jean Charte insists that she is the anomaly.  Her case 
rests on the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–
                                                 
* William E. Havemann withdrew as counsel on July 19, 2018, 
prior to the issuance of this opinion. 
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3733 (2012), which is a statute that Congress enacted during 
the Civil War to stem fraud against the federal government.  
United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309 (1976).  The 
FCA includes a qui tam1 provision to encourage actions by 
private individuals—called relators—who are entitled to a 
portion of the amount recovered, subject to certain limitations.  
See § 3730(b), (d).  In turn, a relator is required to provide the 
government with the information she intends to rely on so that 
the government can make an informed decision as to whether 
it should intervene.  § 3730(b)(2).  In the event that the 
government elects to pursue what is ultimately its claim 
through an “alternate remedy,” the statute provides that the 
relator retains the same rights she would have had in the FCA 
action.  § 3730(c)(5).   
 Charte instituted an FCA action alleging that the 
defendants, including James Wegeler, Sr., submitted false 
reimbursement claims to the United States Department of 
Education.  She provided the requisite information to the 
government and cooperated with the government while it 
determined whether it would intervene.  During this period, the 
information she provided led directly to an investigation that 
resulted in the criminal prosecution of Wegeler, Sr., for tax 
                                                 
 1  “Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro 
domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which 
means who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf 
as well as his own.”  United States ex rel. Charte v. Am. Tutor, 
Inc., 934 F.3d 346, 347 n.1 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. 
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000)). 
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fraud and tax evasion.  Wegeler, Sr. ultimately entered into a 
plea agreement that required him to pay $1.5 million in 
restitution.  He paid the restitution by the time he was 
sentenced.  Subsequently, the government declined to 
intervene in the FCA action. 
 Charte learned of the plea agreement and tried to 
intervene in the criminal proceeding to secure her alleged 
interest in a share of the restitution.  Her motion to do so was 
denied, however.  Her appeal to us thus presents a question of 
first impression for our Court:  whether a criminal proceeding 
constitutes an “alternate remedy” to a civil qui tam action under 
the FCA, entitling a relator to intervene in the criminal action 
and recover a share of the proceeds pursuant to § 3730(c)(5).   
 We determine that the rights to participate in a 
proceeding that the alternate-remedy provision provides a 
relator does not extend to a criminal proceeding.  Such a 
holding would be tantamount to an interest in participating as 
a co-prosecutor in the criminal case of another.  Charte’s 
important aid to the government notwithstanding, she lacks 
standing to assert such an interest under “the long line of 
precedent holding that a [private individual] lacks a judicially 
cognizable interest in [another]’s prosecution” and likewise, 
“in [another’s] sentence.”  United States v. Stoerr, 695 F.3d 
271, 277–78 (3d Cir. 2012).  Even if we focused on only her 
alleged interest in a share of the restitution, nothing in the FCA 
suggests that a relator has a right to intervene in the 
government’s alternative-remedy provision proceeding for the 
purpose of asserting this interest.  The text and sparse 
legislative history regarding the alternate-remedy provision 
counsel otherwise, as they together make clear that the court 
overseeing the FCA suit determines whether and to what extent 
a relator is entitled to an award. Our holding is 
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straightforward—a qui tam relator lacks standing to intervene 
as to her rights to prosecute a case alongside the government, 
and lacks a basis to do so as to her right to an award.  We will 
therefore affirm the District Court.  As was evident before this 
action, Charte may pursue her right to an award by conducting 
the FCA action.  
I.  Background 
A.  Legal 
 An action under the FCA can be brought either by the 
government or a private person “in the name of the 
Government.”  31 U.S.C. § 3730(a), (b).  If such a person—
known as a relator—files the action, the complaint is filed in 
camera, sealed for at least sixty days, and served on the 
government but not the defendant until so ordered by the court.  
§ 3730(b)(2).  The government can move for “extensions of the 
time during which the complaint remains under seal” for good 
cause.  § 3730(b)(3).  Before the end of the expiration of time, 
the government must either “proceed with the action, in which 
case the action shall be conducted by the Government,” or 
“notify the court that it declines to take over the action, in 
which case the person bringing the action shall have the right 
to conduct the action.”  § 3730(b)(4). 
 If the government intervenes and proceeds with the 
FCA action, “it shall have the primary responsibility for 
prosecuting the action, and shall not be bound by an act of the 
person bringing the action . . . .”  § 3730(c)(1).  However, the 
relator retains “the right to continue as a party to the action,” 
subject to certain limitations.  Id.  In addition, the relator 
“receive[s] at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of 
the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim, depending 
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upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed 
to the prosecution of the action.”  § 3730(d)(1).  That amount 
is reduced to “no more than 10 percent” if  
the action is one which the court finds to be based 
primarily on disclosures of specific information 
(other than information provided by 
the person bringing the action) relating to 
allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or 
administrative hearing, in a congressional, 
administrative, or Government Accounting 
Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or 
from the news media . . . .” 
Id.  
 Where the Government declines to intervene, “the 
person who initiated the action shall have the right to conduct 
the action,” although “the court, without limiting the status and 
rights of the person initiating the action, may nevertheless 
permit the government to intervene at a later date upon a 
showing of good cause.”  § 3730(c)(3).  When the relator 
conducts the action, she shall receive an amount “not less than 
25 percent and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of the 
action or settlement.”  § 3730(d)(2). 
 This assortment of rights is rounded out by the FCA’s 
alternate-remedy provision, under which the government may 
“elect[] to pursue its claim through any alternate remedy 
available to the Government, including any administrative 
proceeding to determine a civil money penalty.”  § 3730(c)(5) 
(emphasis added).  And “[i]f any such alternate remedy is 
pursued in another proceeding, the person initiating the action 
shall have the same rights in such proceeding as such person 
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would have had if the action had continued under” the FCA.  
Id. (emphasis added).  Moreover, “[a]ny finding of fact or 
conclusion of law made in such other proceeding that has 
become final shall be conclusive on all parties to” the FCA 
action.  Id. 
 This framework sets the stage for the case at hand. 
B.  Factual and Procedural 
 Charte worked at American Tutor, Inc., a business that 
received Title I funds to provide supplemental educational 
services to New Jersey school districts.  She alleged that, 
during her employment, she noticed questionable billing 
practices, including billing for absent students and services not 
provided.  She filed a qui tam complaint in 2010, after her 
termination in 2007.  The complaint, under the FCA and New 
Jersey False Claims Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:32C-1 to -18 
(West 2010), alleged that the defendants submitted false claims 
for reimbursement to the United States Department of 
Education.  The district court stayed the proceeding and kept it 
under seal until 2017, when the Government ultimately 
declined to intervene.  In the interim, Charte and her counsel 
“provided information, documents and even deposition 
testimony from a separate matter” to the government.  
Appellant Br. 15; see JA 83. 
 While the FCA suit was still unresolved, the 
government brought criminal charges against Wegeler, Sr. for 
tax fraud and tax evasion.  Wegeler, Sr. pleaded guilty.  The 
plea agreement requested restitution in the amount of $1.5 
million representing the tax loss.  It states: 
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This agreement was reached without regard to 
any civil or administrative matters that may be 
pending or commenced in the future against 
JAMES WEGELER.  This agreement does not 
prohibit the United States . . . or any third party 
from initiating or prosecuting any civil or 
administrative proceeding against JAMES 
WEGELER. 
Plea Agreement 5, ECF No. 4, United States v. Wegeler, No. 
16-0273 (D.N.J. June 13, 2016).  Wegeler, Sr. paid the 
restitution amount by the time of sentencing. 
 In October 2016, before Wegeler, Sr. was sentenced, 
Charte filed a motion to intervene in the criminal proceeding, 
alleging a right to a relator’s award from the restitution amount.  
She also filed the same motion in the FCA proceeding.  At the 
hearing on Charte’s motion to intervene in the criminal case, 
the government admitted that it likely would not have focused 
on Wegeler, Sr., as a potential subject of a criminal proceeding, 
if Charte had not named him in the qui tam action.   
 The District Court denied the motion, noting that 
nothing here warranted an exception to the general rule that 
private citizens “lack[] a judicially cognizable interest in the 
prosecution or non-prosecution of another” and no Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure permits intervention.  JA 10 
(quoting United States v. Kurlander, 24 F. Supp. 3d 417, 424 
(D.N.J. 2014)).  It rejected Charte’s argument that the criminal 
proceeding was an “alternate remedy” under the FCA, 
particularly in this case where the FCA’s bar on Internal 
Revenue Code qui tam claims meant that Charte could not have 
included tax fraud allegations in her complaint.   
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 The district court in the FCA action later granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  The court 
applied New Jersey preclusion law and held that Charte’s 
settlement and dismissal of a state case that alleged defamation 
and other claims arose out of the same transaction and 
occurrence and among substantially the same parties, therefore 
barring her FCA suit.  Charte appealed the summary judgment 
decision.  Since this case could be affected by that appeal, we 
held it C.A.V. pending resolution of the appeal.  The district 
court’s summary judgment decision was reversed on August 
12, 2019.  Am. Tutor, Inc., 934 F.3d at 354 (holding that New 
Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine did not apply to bar 
Charte’s federal qui tam action).  We now turn to this case. 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
A. Jurisdiction 
 Charte’s contention comes by way of three appeals, 
only one of which—the appeal from the denial of intervention 
in the criminal proceeding, docketed as No. 17-1717—is 
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properly before us.2  The District Court had jurisdiction over 
that proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.3   
 We lack jurisdiction over the appeals in the FCA action, 
No. 17-1718.  Charte filed her notice of appeal in the FCA case 
concerning the motion to intervene after her thirty days to 
appeal had expired, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). The district court 
never extended the time to appeal.4  Thus, even if she were able 
                                                 
 2   We need not determine whether a motion to intervene 
as of right in criminal cases is immediately appealable as it is 
in civil cases, see McClune v. Shamah, 593 F.2d 482, 485 (3d 
Cir. 1979), because the notice became ripe once a judgment 
was entered, see Khan v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 691 F.3d 488, 494 
n.3 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that a premature notice is sufficient 
“so long as the notice of appeal adequately advised the 
government of what was being appealed, the premature filing 
did not cause prejudice, and the notice of appeal was not filed 
extraordinarily prematurely”). 
 3  The District Court denied Charte’s motion to 
intervene on January 31, 2017, and Charte filed her notice of 
appeal on March 28, 2017.  The District Court subsequently 
granted her request for an extension of time to file the notice 
because of technical issues.   
 4   Charte argues that she was entitled to sixty days to 
file an appeal in the FCA case because the government, having 
not decided whether to intervene at the time the notice was 
filed, was a party to the case.  Her argument is unpersuasive, 
and her attempt to distinguish United States ex rel. Eisenstein 
v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928 (2009), is belied by the clear 
language in that case.  Id. at 931 (“Although the United States 
is aware of and minimally involved in every FCA action, we 
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to appeal the interlocutory order, her notice of appeal was 
untimely, and we lack appellate jurisdiction in No. 17-1718.   
 Charte’s “Petition for Permission to Appeal,” (No. 17-
8009) meanwhile, was filed fifty-eight days after the District 
Court’s January 31, 2017 order denying her motion to 
intervene and did not identify any statute or rule authorizing 
the appeal.  We discern no basis to exercise appellate 
jurisdiction over it, see Fed. R. App. P. 5(b)(1)(D), and the 
earlier referral of the appeal to a merits panel does not 
eliminate this Court’s responsibility to ensure that we have 
jurisdiction.  Anthony v. Council, 316 F.3d 412, 416 (3d Cir. 
2003);  see also FW/PBS Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 
230-31 (1990) (We review our subject matter jurisdiction over 
the matter Aeven if the courts below have not passed on it, and 
even if the parties fail to raise the issue before us.@). 
B. Standard of Review 
 As to the standard of review for No. 17-1717, 
“[a]lthough we generally review dispositions of motions to 
intervene for abuse of discretion, the district court here did not 
exercise discretion in denying the motion to intervene but 
barred the claims because of its legal conclusion” that Charte 
does not have a basis to intervene in a criminal proceeding.  
Nelson v. Cty. Of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1012 (3d Cir. 1995).  
Our review is plenary where that is the case.  Id. 
                                                 
hold that it is not a ‘party’ to an FCA action for purposes of the 
appellate filing deadline unless it has exercised its right to 
intervene in the case.”). 
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III.  Discussion 
 Charte casts a wide net in framing the question on 
appeal,5 but it is simply  “whether a criminal . . . proceeding 
constitutes an ‘alternate remedy’ to a civil qui tam action under 
the False Claims Act, entitling a relator to intervene in the 
criminal action and recover a share of the proceeds pursuant to 
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5).”  United States v. Van Dyck, 866 F.3d 
1130, 1131 (9th Cir. 2017).  The answer is no.  First, a relator 
lacks standing to intervene in the criminal prosecution of 
another. Moreover, the FCA does not provide a right to 
intervene to recover a share of the proceeds derived from a 
proceeding that the government pursues under the alternate-
remedy provision.   
 
                                                 
5  Charte frames the question in four different ways:  as (1) 
“[w]hether the Court erred when it found that the criminal 
proceeding against the Defendant James Wegeler, Sr., did not 
constitute an ‘alternate remedy’ . . . [,]” (2) “[w]hether the 
Court erred when it determined that the Relator in this qui tam 
proceeding could not intervene in a criminal proceeding that 
constituted an ‘alternate remedy’ . . . [,]” (3) “[w]hether the 
Relator may recover a relator’s share award from the restitution 
paid by the criminal Defendant within a proceeding that 
constitutes an ‘alternate remedy’ . . . [,]” and (4) “[w]hether the 
Government can rely upon 31 U.S.C. § 3729(d) where as here 
the Relator has not alleged any violations of the IRC in her 
Complaint.”  Appellant’s Op. Br. 7.   
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A.  
 The rights the FCA provides to a relator when the 
government “proceeds with the action” and that would also be 
afforded to a relator if the government pursues an alternate 
remedy under § 3730(c)(5) are twofold.   
 First, a relator “shall have the right to continue as a 
party to the action . . . .”  § 3730 (c)(1) (emphasis added).  This 
encompasses a suite of rights to participate in a proceeding 
pursuant to the alternate-remedy provision, consisting of the 
rights to:  (i) notice and an opportunity to be heard if the 
government moves to dismiss the action, (ii) object to a 
settlement so that the court can ensure it is “fair, adequate, and 
reasonable under all the circumstances,” and (iii) an otherwise 
unrestricted ability to participate “during the course of 
litigation” unless the government shows that such “unrestricted 
participation . . . would interfere with or unduly delay the 
Government’s prosecution of the case, or would be repetitious, 
irrelevant,” or if, “for purposes of harassment,” the court 
decides “in its discretion” to “impose limitations on the 
person’s participation . . . .”  § 3730(c)(2)(A)–(D).  The 
limitations consist of “(i) limiting the number of witnesses the 
person may call; (ii) limiting the length of the testimony of 
such witnesses; (iii) limiting the person’s cross-examination of 
witnesses; or (iv) otherwise limiting the participation by the 
person in the litigation.”  § 3730(c)(2)(C). Second, a relator has 
a right to “at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent” of 
the proceeds that result from such an action, or, under certain 
circumstances, “no . . . more than 10 percent.”  § 3730(d)(1).   
 The Senate Report regarding this provision sums up 
many of these rights as:  “the qui tam relator retains all the 
same rights to copies of filings and depositions, to objections 
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of settlements or dismissals, to taking over the action if the 
Government fails to proceed with ‘reasonable diligence’, as 
well as to receiving a portion of any recovery.”  S. Rep. 99-
345, at 27 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 
5292.6   
                                                 
6   The Sixth Circuit has noted that “the quoted passage of the 
Senate Report refers to § 3730(c)(3), not § 3730(c)(5), 
suggesting that it might refer to an earlier draft of the 1986 
FCA amendments.”  United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. 
Health Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634, 648 (6th Cir. 2003).  However, 
the proposed legislative language in the report concerning the 
alternate-remedy provision is substantially similar to that 
which appears in the current text.  Compare S. Rep. 99-345, at 
42 (“Notwithstanding subsection (b), the Government may 
elect to pursue its claim through any alternate remedy available 
to it, including, but not limited to, any administrative civil 
money penalty proceeding.” (italics removed)), with 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(c)(5) (“Notwithstanding subsection (b), the 
Government may elect to pursue its claim through any alternate 
remedy available to the Government, including any 
administrative proceeding to determine a civil money 
penalty.”). 
 The Sixth Circuit also stated that the report may be 
internally inconsistent in that it suggests both that the 
Government must first intervene before pursuing an alternate 
remedy, see S. Rep. 99-345, at 42 (“Subsection (c)(3) 
of section 3730 clarifies that the Government, once it 
intervenes and takes over a false claim suit brought by a private 
individual, may elect to pursue any alternate remedy . . . .” 
(emphasis added)), and that pursuit of an alternate remedy is 
an either/or, see id. (“[T]he Government must elect to pursue 
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1.  
 The assertion of the first set of rights in the criminal case 
of another whereby the relator would be a party to the action 
would amount to an interest in that person’s prosecution.  
Indeed, relators would essentially have a voice in whether and 
how the government would go about securing a guilty verdict 
(or plea), as well as in determining the sentence(s) it will ask 
the court to impose.  That is squarely at odds with the long held 
tradition of American jurisprudence that “a private citizen 
lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or  
non[-]prosecution of another.”  Linda, 410 U.S. at 619.   
                                                 
the false claims action either judicially or administratively . . 
. .”).  Bledsoe, 342 F.3d at 648.  Courts have adopted that the 
latter interpretation.  See id. at 647 (“We hold that ‘alternate 
remedy’ refers to the government’s pursuit of any alternative 
to intervening in a relator’s qui tam action.”); United States ex 
rel. Barajas v. U.S., 258 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2001) (“An 
alternate remedy under § 3730(c)(5) is a remedy achieved 
through the government’s pursuit of a claim after it has chosen 
not to intervene in a qui tam relator’s FCA action.”); United 
States ex rel. LaCorte v. Wagner, 185 F.3d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 
1999) (“Section 3730(c)(5) assumes that the original qui tam 
action did not continue.”); United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. 
Cty. of Delaware, 123 F.3d 734, 739 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting the 
“Government’s right to proceed administratively as an 
alternate remedy to an FCA action”), abrogated on other 
grounds by Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280 (2010).   
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 The tradition derives from the Case or Controversy 
Clause of Article III of the Constitution, which “establish[es 
an] irreducible constitutional minimum of” an injury in fact7 
that is caused by the conduct complained of and which is likely 
to be redressed by a favorable decision.  Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).  While “Congress may 
enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which 
creates standing,” Linda, 410 U.S. at 617 n.3, the injury-in-fact 
requirement does not dissipate “whenever a statute grants a 
person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to 
sue to vindicate that right.”  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 
1540, 1549 (2016).  Congress is merely capable of invoking 
the absolute limit of this Constitutional floor by “creating legal 
rights, the invasion of which creates [injury],” where none 
would have previously existed.  Linda, 410 U.S. at 617 n.3.   
 In that vein, as to the interest created by the first set of 
rights the FCA provides relators, the District Court properly 
assessed that an interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution 
of an individual has been considered too generalized and 
speculative to meet the floor set by Article III.  See, e.g., Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 576 (“Vindicating the public interest . . . is the 
function of Congress and the Chief Executive.” (emphasis in 
original)).  Even where Congress has authorized a private 
individual “to enforce public rights in their own names,” the 
Supreme Court has required her to “demonstrate that the 
violation of that public right has caused [her] a concrete, 
                                                 
 7  “Injury in fact” is defined as “an invasion of a legally 
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . 
and (b) actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural or 
‘hypothetical[.]’”  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted). 
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individual harm distinct from the general population.”  Spokeo, 
136 S. Ct. at 1553.  Here, Charte is no different than any other 
member of the public in terms of the concrete harm she 
suffered when the government chose to prosecute or not 
prosecute Wegeler, Sr.  Thus, regardless of whether these 
rights stem from the FCA, she lacks standing to assert them.8 
2.  
 Perhaps anticipating the foregoing, Charte says:  
[she] does not seek to intervene in the criminal 
proceeding proper.  James Wegeler, Sr. has 
already been sentenced and has paid his 
restitution.  [Her] proposed intervention will 
                                                 
 8  In that regard, the other instances of third parties being 
permitted to intervene in criminal proceedings to which Charte 
points us are inapposite.  Those instances concern the 
adjudication of limited, collateral questions such as the third 
party’s constitutional right to access the proceeding or their 
right to assert a privilege in the proceeding.  See, e.g., In re 
Associated Press, 162 F.3d 503, 506–09 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(concerning the first amendment right of access to court 
proceedings); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 554–57 
(3d Cir. 1982) (same); Fed. R. Crim. P. 60 (allowing victims to 
assert a right to notice of a proceeding, to attend, and “to be 
reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court 
concerning release, plea, or sentencing involving a crime” 
(emphases added)).  That is a far cry from being allowed to 
criminally prosecute another in the name of, and along with, 
the United States.  
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simply be to protect the [her] interest, and that of 
the United States, in [her] share.  
Appellant Op. Br. 5.  She made a similar statement to the 
District Court.  JA 40 (stating in the preliminary statement of 
the brief supporting her motion that, “Jean Charte files this 
Motion to ensure that monies received by the United States 
from Mr. James Wegeler, Sr. are subject to her claim under the 
False Claims Act.” (emphasis added)). 
 We routinely adjudicate the assertion of statutory-
procedural rights regarding similar property interests in 
criminal proceedings.  For example, in criminal forfeiture 
proceedings, 21 U.S.C. § 853 permits intervention only in 
limited circumstances “(1) third parties who had a vested 
interest in the property at the time of the commission of the acts 
that gave rise to forfeiture, and (2) bona fide purchasers for 
value without cause to believe the property was subject to 
forfeiture.”  Van Dyck, 866 F.3d at 1133 (citing § 853(n)(6)).   
 Charte’s assertions are similar:  that she has a vested 
interest in a share of the restitution and that the FCA grants her 
a procedural right to intervene to protect that interest.  The 
former assertion is aided by the fact that, as to this set of rights, 
the FCA is “regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the 
Government’s damages claim,” such that “the United States’ 
injury in fact suffices to confer standing on” relators in FCA 
suits.  Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 
U.S. 765, 773–74 (2000) (“[The] adequate basis for the 
relator’s [FCA] suit for his bounty is to be found in the doctrine 
that the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in 
fact suffered by the assignor.” (emphasis added)).   
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 In that light, a ruling against Charte on this point would 
require accepting that a relator has standing to “obtain[] 
compensation for, or prevent[] the violation of” her right to a 
relator’s award, id. at 772, but nonetheless saying that she lacks 
standing to do exactly that, all against the backdrop that we 
routinely adjudicate similar interests by third-parties in 
criminal proceedings.  To be clear, when it comes to a criminal 
forfeiture proceeding, we agree that a relator has standing to 
assert the relator’s “statutory procedural right . . . under the 
alternate-remedy provision to have her relator’s share 
adjudicated in the criminal forfeiture proceeding.”.  See United 
States v. Couch, 906 F.3d 1223, 1226–27 (11th Cir. 2018) 
(explaining that the relator’s “motion to intervene in a 
[criminal] proceeding to enforce an alleged property interest is 
materially different from an attempt to compel a criminal 
prosecution or alter a sentence”).  That agreement 
notwithstanding, however, we are not persuaded that a relator 
in fact possesses such a statutory procedural right.   
 As the government forcefully argues, the text of the 
FCA “compels the understanding” that “the district court in the 
[FCA] suit remains responsible for adjudicating the relator’s 
share of the proceeds of an alternate proceeding” brought by 
the government under the alternate-remedy provision.  
Appellee Br. 22.  The alternate-remedy provision assumes that 
the FCA suit will continue after the alternate-remedy 
proceeding has concluded when it states “[a]ny finding of fact 
or conclusion of law made in such proceeding that has become 
final shall be conclusive on all parties to an action under this 
section.”  31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5).  The FCA then provides 
detailed guidelines for determining a relator’s share in the 
“proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim,” where “the 
government proceeds with [the] action.”  § 3730(d)(1).  That 
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is, that the relator is entitled to “at least 15 percent but not more 
than 25 percent . . ., depending upon the extent to which the 
person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the 
action[,]” and “no . . . more than 10 percent” where “the action 
is one which the court finds to be based primarily on 
disclosures of specific information (other than information 
provided by the person bringing the action) . . . taking into 
account the significance of the information and the role of the 
person bringing the action in advancing the case to litigation.”  
Id. (emphases added). 
 While other courts may use the procedural devices 
available to them to assess the requisite “finding[s] of fact or 
conclusion of law made in another proceeding,” that the FCA 
outright provides this to the FCA court, as well as that the FCA 
court is readily apprised of the information a relator provides 
to the government, is a strong indication that Congress 
intended the FCA court to be the one to make these 
comparative determinations.  That indication is even stronger 
when one considers that the provisions setting forth the right to 
a relator’s award are set forth in § 3730(d)(1), labeled “Award 
to qui tam plaintiff,” whereas the rights that accompany “the 
right to continue as a party to the action” are all set forth in 
§ 3730(c)(1) and (2), labeled “Rights of the parties to qui tam 
actions.”   
 Those textual and structural indicia are reinforced by 
the Senate Report’s statement that “[i]f the Government 
proceeds administratively, the district court shall stay the civil 
action pending the administrative proceeding and any petitions 
by the relator, in order to exercise his rights [in such 
proceeding,] will be to the district court” rather than the court 
in the proceeding pursued by the government under the 
alternate-remedy provision.  S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 27.  
23 
 
Together, these points compel the conclusion that, to the extent 
that the FCA provides relators a right to intervene in another 
proceeding, their interest in a share in the proceeds recovered 
in that proceeding is not among those for which this right is 
provided.   
 In other words, Charte is less like third parties in the 21 
U.S.C. § 853 context, who are provided an express right to 
intervene to assert their property interest, than she is like 
victims, who also have an interest in any restitution that is 
awarded but are not granted a statutory right to intervene and 
assert it.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(a)(1) (requiring a court to 
order restitution “to the victim of the offense or, if the victim 
is deceased, to the victim’s estate”); Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1(a) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 
2016) (requiring that, “[i]n the case of an identifiable victim, 
the court shall . . . enter a restitution order for the full amount 
of the victim’s loss . . .”); but see Stoerr, 695 F.3d at 278 
(noting that restitution orders can only be appealed and 
modified “by the defendant and by the Government,” and that 
“[crime] victims are non-parties to criminal proceedings”); 
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52 (1986) (“Although 
restitution does resemble a judgment ‘for the benefit of’ the 
victim, . . . [t]he victim has no control over the amount of 
restitution awarded or over the decision to award restitution.”).  
 We are therefore aligned with our two sister circuits that 
have addressed this question and hold that (1) a relator “lacks 
standing to intervene in [the] criminal prosecution[] of 
another” as it pertains to her participation rights, Van Dyck, 866 
F.3d at 1133, and (2) even if a relator had standing to intervene 
only as to her alleged interest in her share of the proceeds 
collected by the government, the “sole remedy” that the FCA 
provides her is to “commence” or continue the FCA action, id. 
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at 1135 (“The ‘alternate remedy’ provisions of the False 
Claims Act do not permit a relator to intervene in a criminal 
action for the purpose of asserting a right to the proceeds of 
that action.”); see also Couch, 906 F.3d at 1228 (“[T]he 
alternate-remedy provision does not expressly provide a right 
of intervention in an ‘alternate proceeding.’” (emphasis 
added)). 
 In so holding, we do not opine on whether a criminal 
proceeding is an alternate remedy such that a relator retains her 
FCA rights, including the right to a share in the proceeds.9  Nor 
do we need to decide whether, even if a criminal proceeding 
constituted an alternate remedy, the proceedings here would 
qualify in light of the fact that 31 U.S.C. § 3729(d) precludes a 
relator from obtaining a relator’s share in a claim under the 
Internal Revenue Code.  See § 3729(d) (“This section does not 
apply to claims, records, or statements made under the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986.”).  District Courts adjudicating FCA 
suits routinely make these determinations and are best 
equipped to do so. 
* * * * * 
 In the end, then, we maintain “the long line of precedent 
holding that a [private individual] lacks a judicially cognizable 
interest in [another]’s prosecution” and likewise, “in 
[another’s] sentence.”  Stoerr, 695 F.3d at 277–78.  And Charte 
                                                 
 9 Charte’s argument that “[d]enying the existence of an 
alternate remedy works an anomalous outcome that treats [her] 
less favorabl[y] than tax whistleblowers under Title 26,” 
Appellant Op. Br. 51, speaks to whether she is entitled to a 
share in the restitution, so it too does not warrant opining. 
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is not the exception she claimed to be:  she may not pursue her 
alleged interest in a relator’s award in Wegeler, Sr.’s criminal 
case.  Charte may nonetheless take solace in the government’s 
representation—to this Court and to our two sister circuits that 
have confronted this question—that it “allow[s] a qualified 
relator to a share of the full amount of [a] damages award, 
including the restitution previously paid.”  Appellee Br. 29 
(citing United States v. Wellcare Health Plans, Inc., 2011 WL 
4431157, *2 (M.D. Fla. 2011), where “the Government . . . 
escrowed 25% of [a] $40 million restitution, pending a 
resolution of the [related] qui tam cases for [the] purpose” of 
allowing the “Movant and the other relators” to “participat[e] 
in the distribution of restitution paid incident to the criminal 
prosecution”); see also Couch, 906 F.3d at 1228–29; Van 
Dyck, 866 F.3d at 1135 n.3.  For our part, we will affirm the 
District Court’s order denying her motion to intervene. 
